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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

G & G ~liNING COMPANY,
Petitioner

-vs.-

TAX

COM~1ISSION

OF UTA.H

'

OF THE STATE

Case No.
8595

Respondent

PETITIONERS' BRIEF

STATE~iEN1~

OF FACTS

The questions here involved relate to the assess1neni
of the Mine Occupation Tax pursuant to Chapter 5,
Title 59, []tah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The
Tax Commission in its decision No. 166 dated the lOth
day of Septe:mber, 1956, decreed that the petitioners be
ordered to pay to the State Tax Commission a Mine
Occupation Tax based upon sales of ore during 1.954 in
the sum of $12,628.08 (R. 72).
The action arises out of mining operations conducted by the petitioners on a portion of the MiVida
claim o'vned by Utex Exploration Company pursuant
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to the terms of an instrument designated "Lease'' made
and entered into on the 11th day of February, 1953, between the lJtex Exploration Company, a Utah corporation, designated therein as lessor, and Archie Garwood,
R. C. Gerlach and W. E. Bozman, designated therein as
lessees (R. 11, 84, Exhibit 1). The taxpayers are all
residents of Cortez, Colorado (Exhibit 1). The lease
was for a term of two years expiring on February 11,
1955. During the term of the lease the lessees, as a
1natter of convenience, 'vere referred to by Utex as G &G
~lining Company (R. 10-11). The lessees, which shall
hereinafter be referred to as the petitioners, mined, relnoved and sold ore from the premises beginning February 11, 1953, until November 17, 1954 (R. 13). During
the operations of the petitioners ore \Yas shipped to an
. ~EC purchaser and upon settlement litex Exploration
Company was paid directly the percentage of production
provided by the lease, the petitioners only accounting
to l~tex for any under pay1nent (R. 2±).
On or about the 17th day of Xove1nber, 195±, the
petitioners rereiYed a letter from lTtex Exploration
1
( 01npany ter1ninating the lease and follo·wing Xove1nber
1!J, J 9:l-±, the petitioners llaYe neYer urined, re1noved or
:-;old ore frou1 the ::\[il~ida elain1 and ha-v-e not conducted
any 111ininp; operation~ on ~aid property (R. 16, Exhibit
B).

On July 21, 1955, the petitioners filed with the Tax
C~on11nission a ~tate1nent of Occupation Tax of Mines
and paid to the Tax Conunission the su1u of $9,697.1±
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(R. 22-35, Exhibit 1). This return was filed by petitioners
as the result of discussions between them, the Utex
corporation and Mr. Higgs of the ·T.ax Commission (R.
36). In November of 1955, as a result of their eviction
from the premises by Utex, petitioners were engaged in
litigation with the Utex corporation in the Federal Court
in Salt Lake City (R. 14, 39, 40). At that time the
attorneys for Utex voluntarily advised Mr. Higgs of
the Tax Commission that the petitioners had not paid
an occupation tax for the year 1955, and gave to 1Ir.
Higgs the figures relating to the overall production of
the petitioners for the period of their operation of the
1\1iVida property (R. 39-40). As a result of these circumstances, 1Ir. Higgs, by the process of subtracting
the figures in ~the return furnished in July from those
furnished by Utex, determined that the petitioners owed
a tax in the amount of $12,675.40 (R. 40). Under date
of November 4, 1955, the Executive Seeretary of the
Comrnission wrote a letter to petitioners stating that,
according to their information, they owed a !fine Occupation Tax for 1955 in the amount of $12,675.40 (R.
39-40). A statement of 1v!ine Occupation Tax "\Yas enclosed with the letter but was never signed by petitioners
(R. 17).
In the July return the sum of $641,850.45 was included for the purpose of determining the tax. This
amount of money represented production from February
11, 1953, until October 1, 1953 (R. 33). In computing the
te,x for 1953 based upon decisions of the Supreme Court
that uranium ore during the period of January 1 to
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C)ctoher 1, 1953, was not taxable, petitioners arrived at
the sum of $3,289.44 as the tax due in 1953 (R. 32-33).
In figuring the tax for 1954 Theron Moffett, a Certified
Public Accountant called by petitioners, stated that he
arrived at a 1954 tax in the amount of $12,628.08. He
then gave credit for the over payment in 1953, arriving
at a net tax of $6,209.58 (R. 34). These figures were
hased upon the actual amount of ore shlpped regardless
of when payment was received (R. 34). In computing
the tax for the same years, based upon the amount of
1noney actually received for ore sold during the tax
period, )Jr. ~foffett testified that the petitioners owed
for 1953 the sun1 of $1,793.13, and the money paid in
.July of 1955 results in an over paYJuent in the 8um of
$7,904.01. Figuring the year 1954 on the same basis,
and giving credit for the o-ver payment, )Ioffett testified
that the petitioners owed a tax in the a1nount of $1,604.48
( R. :~2-35, 53-66). The testimony of ){r. :Jioffett relating to the con1putation of tax is set forth in Exhibit
[) at page 105 of the record.

POINT I
A PERSON WHO IS NOT ENG ..-\GED IN THE BUSINESS
OF MINING OR PRODUCING ORE CANNOT BE SUBJECT

TO THE MINE OCCUPATION TAX.
POINT II
THE TAX IS ILLEGAL IN THAT
(A) AN ASSESSMENT MADE OTHER THAN . ~S
. PROVIDED BY STATUTE IS A NULLITY,
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(B) IT IS MANDATORY THAT THE TAX BE FIXED
ON OR BEFORE A DAY CERTAIN.
POINT III
THE ASSESSMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE DE·CISIONS
OF THIS COURT.
POINT IV.
THE TAX WAS NOT PROPERLY COMPUTED.

ARGUl\tiENT
POINT I
A PERSON WHO IS NOT ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS

OF MINING OR PRODUCING ORE CANNOT BE
TO THE MINE OCCUPATION TAX.

Sl~BJECT

The Tax Commission has no authority to assess a
tax unless there is specific statutory authority. The
Legislative Act under which the taxing authority i~
exereised detennines the persons and properties to be
taxed and the time at which the status is to be determined.
The tax in question herein is the Mine Occupation Tax
as set forth in Chapter 5, Title 59, Utah Code An·Jtotated
1953. The authority to impose the tax is di reeted to
persons engaged in the business of mining or producing
ore. The particular statutory provision involved herein
IS:

"59-5-67. Occupation tax-Rate-Ba~is for
computation-Annual exemption-When delinquent.-Except as herein otherwise specifically
provided, every person engaged in the busines.s
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of mining or producing ore *** in this state shall
pay to the state of Utah an occupation tax * * *."
~rhe taxable status of the persons and property
enu1nerated in the statutory provision above referred to
is fixed by Section 59-5-73, Utah Code AVfllnotated 1953.
The two sections read together set forth the category of
the persons taxed and the time when the taxable status
Is detennined. Section 59-5-73 reads as follows:

59-5-73. Xotice of amount of tax.-Not later
than the first l\Ionday in :May of each year, the
tax commission shall fix the amount of occupation
tax that each person shall pay***."
The statutory provisions set forth the persons and
the properties "\vhich may be subjected to the occupation
tax and "\vould appear to be clearly defined. The tax is
directed to nlining property which is produeing ore and
to the persons who are engaged in the business of producing and ~elling ores. ~rhis tax statns is fixed in that
it 1nust be exi ~ting on or before the first day of ~lay as
1>roYided h~~ ~ertion 59-5-73~ supra.
ln the instant ease the petitione1·s ,,~ere not ~ngaged
in the hu~ine8~ of 1nining in 1955. It would be difficult
to i n·norp t]H) }ano-ua!?.·e of the statute relatin~ to the
occupation or aetivity "~hirh is taxed. In tlris respect
tl1(\ natnrt\ of tht\ tnx Jna~~ have son1e in1portance. An
oeeupation tnx is n rPYenue tax i1nposed upon the privi lPg-P of doing busines8. It is distinguished from a license
tnx in that tlH\ lath)r is a 1neasure used to regulate and
prohibit ePrtain business activities. This latter dis,.....,

~

\..l

'-'
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tinction is set out in Pro1)0 C/ity v. Provo Meat & Packing
Co., 49 Utah 528, 165 P. 477:
"As pointed out in the case of Salt Lake
City v. Christensen Co., sup:va, the merchant's
ordinance imposes a tax which is in the nature of
an occupation tax rather than a license tax or
license fee. The term 'occupation tax' is, ho,vever, sometimes also applied to a license fee or
license tax, and thus some confusion h.as at times
arisen concerning the meaning of the two terms.
Properly speaking, a license fee or a license tax
comes within and is based upon the police power
of the state to regulate or to prohibit a particular
business. Such a fee or tax is primarily intended
to regulate .a particular calling or business, and
not to raise revenue, while an occupation tax is
primarily intended to raise revenue by that method of taxation."
The business of mining is not one of the trades or
occupations which a State would regulate or prohibit
by the exercise of its police power through a taxing
statute. While the tax is based upon a specific valuation
of property within a certain territory, assessed at a
stated period and collected at .an appointed time, it is
not a property tax.
The difference bet"lvVeen the tax involved herein and
a property tax, in the ordinary sense of the word, is that
it is a tax relating to the activity of mining or producing
ore rather than the o\vnership of property. In Gl An1.
Jur., Taxation, Sec. 29, p.age 57, it states as follows:
"Section 29. Generally.-Taxes on vroperty
are taxes assessed on all property or on all propSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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erty. of a certain class located within a certain
~erntory on a specified date in proportion to
Its value, or in accordance with some other reasonable m~tho~ of apportionment, the obligation to
pay wh1ch IS absolute and unavoidable and is not
based upon any voluntary aciion of the person
assessed. A property tax is ordinarily measured
by the. amount of property owned by the taxpayer
on a given day, and not on the total amount owned
hy him during the year. It is ordinarily a8sessed
at stated periods determined in advance, and collected at appointed times, and its payment is
usually enforced by sale of the property taxed
and, occasionally, b:~ imprisonment of the person
assessed. • • =~= ."
. .-\.s heretofore stated, the oecupation tax is not a
property tax and it is doubtful if it can be construed
a~ a :--:everance tax for the reasons that the language is
not su~<~ptible to such construction and there is a serious
•1ue~tion as to "Thether or not there is a constitutional
prohibition on severance ta..-x. Section 1:? of . A.rtiele 13,
('rnuditutiou of r-;tah, provides as follows:
Nothing in this Constitution shall be con~trued to preyent the Legislature from providing
a ~tan1p tax. or a t~x based on ineon1e, oceupation,
licen~e~ or franchises. {~\s a.Inended ~ oYeinber
H

(}, 1906) . "

'PhP eon~t itut ionn I proYi sion iten1izes the taxe~ ·which
a rn not prt'VPntPd by other constitutional provisions. A
~('\·Prance tax is not 1nentioned and in aceord "ith the
-~·t·neral rulP~ of inh'rpretation, "There there is an ite1ni-'
~.n tion. thP i ntt'ntion i~ that the ite1nization is eon trolling.
\V (' enne1ude thn t it i~ a tax on the privilege of carrying
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on the activity of mining, which is consistent with the
language of the statute. To be subje·et to the tax it would
seem to require that there be mining property within the
State and that the person be engaged in the mining business. If either of the £~actors are missing at the time
fixed by the statute, there is no authority to assess the
tax. Box Elder Co1.tnty et al. 't:. Conley, County Assessor,.
et al., 79lTtah 199, 284 P. 105:
" 'Of course, it is necessary that there be a
time as of which the taxable situs of property
is to be fixed, whether the situs is dependent on
the location of the property or of the person. Generally, a date is fixed by statute as of which the
situs of property for purpose of taxation depends,
at least so far as the place within the state where
property is to be taxed is concerned. * * *' "
In the instant case the tax was directed at the ~fi
v·ida mining claim in San Juan County owned by Charles
Steen. During the year 1955 petitioners were not living
in Utah, but were residents of the State of Colorado.
During said year they were not conducting any mining
operations nor engaged in the business of rnining or
producing ore on the Mi\7.ida claim. This points up the
time at which the taxable status is. determined. The
statute is clear that the assessrrient is to be rnade on or
before the first Monday of May of each year. In vie"r
of the fact that it is directly tied to a calendar year, it
cannot be construed to be a tax for any year except the
year in which it is assessed. The fact that the statute
provides that the prior year's production is the basi~
for the computation of the tax does not obliterat~e the
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~rov~si.on that it is a tax on the privilege of engaging

In m1n1ng business in the year assessed. In the case of
Title Insurance and Trust Company v. Franchise Tax
Board (Cal. 1956) 302 P. 2d 79, the California Court
stated as follows:
"The franchise tax here levied was for the
privilege of doing business in 1943 regardless of
the fact that a prior year's earnings constituted
the 1neasuring rod of the amount of the tax. A
tax for the privilege of doing business within the
~tate is no less a tax upon this year's privilege because measured by last year's income. Is not
sueeess in the recent past the best criterion for
1neasuring the value of doing business now~ Since
the forn1ula prescribed by the legislature for deri,ing the taxes due by a trust company furnishes
an approxin1ation of the amount accrued and since
there appears no abuse of power by the legislation. it "~ill not be disturbed. See Fulleton Oil
C\). Y. J ohn~on, ~ CaL 2d 162, 175. 39 P. 2d 796."
This l 1 ourt ha:' preYiously stated that this tax is on
orP 1nined in the :-ear prior to the year in \Yhich the tax
lH\e~une d<)linquent. Consolidated ['Tranilnn ]lines, Inc.
r. Ta.r ('onnni . .-.~iou of the State of [7tah (1955), 4 Itah
:!d :2:~fi. :2~)1 P. :2d 8~(). Ho"..ever, persons n1ust be engaged
in th<) bu~in0~~ in the :-ear the tax is assessed. The tax
hPrP inYnlYPd 1nn~t be assE::•ssed on or before the first
~I nnda~· in ~[ny c_)f 193~l. The petitioners "~ere not enp;n.~<'d in t ht' hn~inc.·~~ of 1nining or producing ore on the
'I i \:--ida elnin1 at anY
. tiine during· the .Y~nr 1955 and ·were
not n\~idP11t~ of tlH' 8tah_• of l . . tnh or doing anything in
l Ttah \rhieh \\·onld 8Ubjee.t then1 to the taxing authority.
~
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The Legislature did not intend by the language used to
tax such persons.
POINT II
THE TAX IS ILLEGAL IN THAT
(A) AN ASSESSMENT MADE OTHER THAN AS PROVIDED BY STATUTE IS A NULLITY,
(B) IT IS MANDATORY THAT THE 'TAX BE FIXED
ON OR BEFORE A DAY CERTAIN.

Notwithstanding the question as to whether or not
a particular person or property is subject to a tax, the
taxing authority must act within the scope of the Constit~ltional and Legislative authority. This is pointed
out in Moss, County Atty., ex rel. State Tax Com1nission
v. Board of C1om'rs of Salt Lake City, et al., (1953), 1
Utah 2d 60, 261 P. 2d 961:
"The City's power to tax is derived solely
from legislative enactment and it has only such
authority as is expressly conferred or necessarily
implied. This court has not favored the extension
of the powers of the city by implication, and the
only modification of such doctrine is where the
power is one which is necessarily implied. Unless this requirement is met, the power cannot be
deduced from any consideration of convenience
or necessity, or desirability of such result, and no
doubtful inference from other powers granted or
from ambiguous or uncertain provisions of the
law would be sufficient to sustain such authority.
This is a fortiori true in the instant situation, because in case of any ambiguity or uncertainty as
to authority to impose taxes, the doubt rnust be
resolved in favor of the taxp:ayer."
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And where there is doubt as to the intention of the Legislature the statutes must be construed in favor of the
taxpayer.
F. Jensen Candy Co. 1.i. State Tax Commission (1936), 90 "Ctah 359, 61 P. 2d 629:

w·.

"Having in mind the general rule that taxation statutes are strictly construed against the
state and in favor of the taxpayer, the language
of the statute permits the collection of the tax at
the rate specified and no more."
~.,or rille t·.

State Tax Co1nJnission (1940), 98

l~tah

170.

97 P. 2d 937:
"The doctrine that taxing statutes are, in case
of doubt as to the intention of the legislature to be,
construed strictly against the taxing authority
and in favor of those on whom the tax is levied,
has been "·ell set out in the case of Helv~ring v.
Stockhohns Enskilda Bank, 293 L'.S. 84, 55 S. Ct.
!10~ 79 L. Ed. 211.~~
.\ ~ heretofore 1nentioned the mine occupation tax is
fixed a~ of a tiine certain, that being the first ~Ionday in
~fay. of eaeh .Year. The ~tatute refers to assessn1ent and
not iee and. for conYenience. is again set forth:
"fln-;)-7;t X otic.e of runount of tax. - Xot
later than the fir~t ::\fondav- in :\IaY of each yeai\
thP tnx cn1nnu~~ion ~hall fix the ainount of occupation tax that t'nrh person shall pay. lminediat~1". tlH' rt'a fter t lH:' person "~hose occupation tax 1s
~·o fi X('d ~hall ht' notified by 1nail, postage prepaid,
nddr('~~('d to hi8 last know·n pla<"e of residence~
of t hP runount of the occupation tax so fixed."
[Tfah Code Annotated 1953.
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It is generally held that where a statute fixes a time for
assessinent such provisions are mandatory. 53 C.J.S.,
Licenses, Section 49, page 671:

"Time for assess1nent. Generally the tax officials must make their assessment within the statutory time, or, where the statute does not fix a
time, within a reasonable time."
\Vhile it is recognized that certain statutory provisions
relating to time have been interpreted as being merely
directory, those provisions relate only to the orderly
ad1ninistration of public affairs. The provisions of Section 59-5-73, supra, are directly related to the taxpayer
and is the only section setting forth the manner in which
he vvill be advised of the assessment. It is the procedure
hy which he knows the property and activity being tax
and the amount thereof. Further it is the only opportunity he has to avoid penalty and interest charges. The
taxpayer is subject to penalty and interest unless he
p,ays his tax on or before June 1st, ordinarily a period
of less than thirty days. Section 59-5-70 and Section
59~5-71, Utah Code Annotated 1953. This proposition is
set forth in 51 Am. Jur., Taxation, page 618:
"Section 652.-~Iandatory and Directory Requirements. - \Vhile the statutes of Inost ~tatc'R
provide in considerable detail how the "'ork of
assessing the taxes sh.all be perform~ed, compliance with all these provisions in exact conformity
to the law is not necessarily a condition precedent
to a valid tax. The test is whether the provision
is for the benefit and protection of the individual
taxpayer or is merely for the orderly administration of public .affairs. All those provisions which
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are intended for his security, for insuring an
equality of taxation, and to enable on·e to know
with reasonable certainty for what real and personal estate he is taxed, and for what all those
who are liable with him are taxed, are -conditions
precedent which must be observed; otherwise, the
assessment will be invalid. ***."
It is manifest that the assessment and notice provisions of the statute are for the protection of the taxpayer. In the instant case the petitioners were first notified of the tax on November 4, 1955. At that tin1e they
were subject to severe p·enalty and interest charges and
were not accorded any process by which they could prevent the possibility of these charges.
We believe this Court has passed upon the nlandatory effect of the provisions relating to the time fixed
by the statute. While the Box Elder case, supra, relates
to a different tax statute, both statutes relate to the
status of the person and property and is for the protection of the taxpayer. The Court therein stated as follows:
"The follo\ving cases support the general rule
of law that, where the taxable status of property
relates to a day certain in each year" no taxes can
be legally ,assessed and levied for a particular
year unless the conditions requisite to liability
exist on the day fixed.'- Box Elder County ~c. Conley, supra.
The Idaho Court has given the san1e effect to statutes relating to the status of property as of a eertain date.
W1~nton L1unbcr Co. r. Shoshone Countp. et al .. (Idaho,
1931)" ~9·+ P. 529:
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""In this state property is .assessable for taxes
as of the second Monday of January. C. S. Section 3097, as amended by Sess. Laws 1927, c. 263,
p. 562, Section 1.; Preston A. Blair Co. v. J·ensen
(Idaho), 286 P. 366. That is, the status and value
of property on that date controls the assessment
for taxation. Preston A. Blair Co. v. Jensen,
supra; Cle~arwater Timber Co. v. Nez P·erce
County ( C.C.) 155 F. 633."
rrhe provisions of Section 59-5-68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, requiring the taxpayer to file a statement
before ~-,ebruary lOth of the year does not do away with
the assessment and notice provisions. The Tax Colnmission is not bound by such statement and makes its assessInent independent thereof. One not engaged in mining
\Vould not file the statem·ent for the obvious reason that
the statute only refers to those so engaged. The language
in respect thereof is clear and in the present tense, not
relating to any previous year. It has been generally
held that the statement of the taxpayer in such cases is
not an assessment. F airlarnb v. Bowle, County Treasurer,
(Colo., 1937), 71 P. 2d 417 :
1

"The mode of ntaking assessments is a legislative function. Stanley v. Little Pittsburg 1vtining Co., 6 Colo. 415. It is for the assessor 'to 1nake
an official estimate of value for the purpose of
taxation. *** Making 01tt a list of property by the
owner, with its estimated value, is not its assessment.' People ex rei. IIallett v. Board of Arapahoe County Cominissioners, 27 Colo. 86, 59 P. 733,
735." (Emphasis added.)
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If the tax involved herein is upheld, then a situation
is presented where a tax liability is imposed where:
1.

'rhe taxpayers are not residing in the State of
Utah

2.

Were not engaged in the business of mining in
the State of Utah

3.

We-re first notified four Inonths after such a.
tax is delinquent

4-.

The tax 'vas not assesse;d

5.

Taxpayers had no notice of an assessn1ent, .and

6.

They are subject to penalties and interest
out notice of assessment.

"~th

The letter of November 4, 1955 (R. 10±, Taxpa~Ters'
Exhibit C) is the basis of the claiin by the Tax Cormnission. Section 59-5-73, Utah Code Annotated 1953, states
without equivocation that the Tax Conn1rission shall fix
the amount of the occupation tax. The letter of Novenlber 4th is not in fact quite so unequivocal .....t\.s a matter
of fact it shows on its face that someone othPr than
the Tax Comn1ission fixed the tax. The language of the
Exhibit referred to is as follo"\YS:
·~According

to information rec.ently received
by this offire your con1pany o,y·es n1ine occupation
tax for 1955 in the an1ount of $12,675.40."
A reasonable. construction to place upon that language

is that the Tax Connnission is collerting a third party's
tax obligation, other\\~ise \\Thy did it not say the ConnnisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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s1on has fixed your tax in the sun1 of $12,675.40 ~ If
people are to be subjected to taxation in this manner,
all that has been written by the Courts and all that has
been enacted into law by the Legislature is for naught.
The property here involved is probably the most famous
lJtah n1ining property of re'Cent times. The petitioners
had paid a surn of money to the Tax Commission on the
21st day of July, 1955, which has no more legality than
that no\\T claimed. Certainly under the circun1stances
the Tax Commission could not say that it was unaware
of the 1nining oper.ation and eertainly no one should be
required to pay taxes twice on the same thing in the same
year.
POINT III
THE ASSESSMENT IS CONTRAR.Y TO THE DECISIONS
OF THIS COURT.

The letter of N oven1ber 4th constitutes the only
docu1nent notifying the taxpayer of the amount of occupation tax fixed by the Corn1nission. As heretofore rnentioned, it states that it is an occupation tax for 1955. If
this be the assessment and the notice required by statute,
then it is in direct conflict with the previous decisions of
this Court. If it is .a n1ine occupation tax for 1955, it
ntust be based upon ore mined and sold during the year
1955. This Court in Consolidated Uran·ium Mines, Inc. v.
Tn.r Commission of the State of [Jtah, 8Upra, stated:
~'Since

the tax is not delinquent until the first
day of June next succeeding the calendar year
\vhen the ore or 1netal is sold, this indicates that
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the tax is on the metal mined in the year prior to
the year in which the tax becomes delinquent, and,
therefore, an imposition of such a tax based on
sales other than those made in the calendar year
sought to be taxed violates the provisions of the
Act. The Tax Commission, therefore, erred when
it purported to base its assessment for the year
1954 on sales made during the year 1953." (Emphasis added.)
The Commission contends that the tax attempted
to be collected is an assessment based upon sales of ores
made during the ye.ar 1954. This is an afterthought
otherwise the tax and what it was for 'vould have been
set forth in the letter of November 4th. The manner in
which the Tax Commission has acted is patently dilitory
and contrary to the statutory provisions. The validity
of its acts must be tested ag.ainst the statutory provisions
and the decisions of this Court. Clearly under both no
valid assessment was made and the attempt to collect
the tax must fail.
POINT IV.
THE TAX WAS NOT PROPERLY COMPUTED.

Since February 11, 1953, the petitioners haYe never
be·en assessed a mine occnp.ation ta..'\: in any 1nanner 'vhat~oever. In July of 1955 the petitioners signed a statement of 1nine occupation tax purporting to be a tax on
1953 ore sales and paid the sun1 of $9,679.14. This payment was the result of conferences bet\Yeen the petitioners, lTtex Exploration Con1pany and the Tax ConlInj~sion (R. 3()). Tht' f.ailure to assess a tax in the
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1nanner provided by law was not an oversight by the
Commission or the careless exercise of a duty, nor was
it because it was not aware of the petitioners' activity.
The record shows that the property is the famous Steen
claim, which is known to practically every man, woman
and child in the State: of Utah, and it would be ridiculous
to assume that the Tax Commission did not know of the
1nining activity.
The reason is apparent why the Commission never
attempted to assess a tax against the petitioners. It regarded the tax as payable by Utex. The payment made
in July 1955, in view of the factual situation, can only be
regarded as an .adjustment of the tax obligation between
the petitioners and Utex. The claim made by the letter
of November 4th is of the same nature, the Tax Commission attempting to adjust the tax obligation between
the. parties 1to a :contract. The payment in July 1955
\v.as not paid under protest and was nothing more than
a paJinent under mistake. It was not the result of any
assessment, the r_eax Commission never claiming it made
an assessment (R. 36).
-\Vhether or not the petitioners have the right to recover the n1oney fron1 the State of Utah is not involved.
However, if the Court determines that the Commission
assessed a tax in conformity with even a liberal interpretation of the statute, then the statement filed in July of
1955 should be considered together with the letter of

November 4th and the two payments adjusted as if it
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were one assessment. Certainly petitioners should not be
subjecte·d to two assessments and two payments for the
same tax in the same year.
If the Comrnission is going to be permitted to tax in
the manner that it did in this instance, then justice requires that the petitioners be given every benefit and
have every doubt resolved in their favor. Upon this
premise the taxpayers should only pay, in the event they
are co1npelled to pay a tax, the sun1 of $1,604.48.
In computing the sum paid in July 1955 the an1ount
of $640,850.45 was included in the computation which
represent1ed sales of ore from February 11, 1953, to
October 1, 1953. By reason of this Court's determination
in Consolidated flrani1t1n . Mines,
.
Inc. 1). Tax Cornmission
of the State of [Ttah, supra, this amount should not have
been figured in the computation of the payrnent. Giving
credit for this, the petitioners made an overpayn1ent in
the sum of $7,90-!.01. Taking the figure expressed in the
letter of November 4th, the petitioners would be subject
to a pay1nent of $9,508.49. Giving effect to the overp,aynlent made in July 1955, the petitioners "\vould o,~ve the
State of Utah $1,604.48. These figures and th·e coinputationH were testified to by Theron E. Moffett, a Certified Puhlie Accountant, ""ho had exa1nined the books of
the petitioners. The testimony is found beginning at
pag-P 31 to 39 and beginning at page 54 to 65. The testiIHOll)'

and the 1nethod of con1putation is set forth in tax-

payf~rs'

Exhibit D found at p.age 105 of the record.
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CONCLUSION
lipon the record in this case a tax is attempted to
be collect~ed by the State of Utah under circumstances
that ignores every statutory requirement. If there is any
due process relating to the imposition of a tax, then the
decision of the Tax Commission in the instant case must
be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

GUSTIN, RICHARDS, ~fATTSSON & E\TANS
Attorneys for Petitioners
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